Palestinian factions sign Beijing agreement but deep obstacles remain

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attends the closing ceremony of a reconciliation dialogue among Palestinian factions resulting in the signing of the Beijing Declaration.
Di Jianlan Xinhua News Agency

On Tuesday, Palestinian factions in Beijing signed yet another unity agreement to overcome 17 years of internal division between the two main Palestinian political factions, Hamas and Fatah.

The deal, of which a leaked copy was published by al-Masry al-Youm, centers primarily around the formation of an “interim national reconciliation government” to take charge of the West Bank and Gaza post-genocide and in preparation for elections, to secure an independent state on 1967 territory, to exclude any foreign role over any part of occupied territory after a ceasefire, as well as expand the Palestine Liberation Organization to include Hamas and other factions.

The Beijing Declaration, as it has been named, gave no timeline for implementation.

Hamas welcomed the declaration, saying it created a “barrier against all regional and international interventions that seek to impose realities against our people’s interests.”

According to Chinese state broadcaster, CCTV, the declaration, also signed by a slew of smaller factions, was evidence of Palestinian consensus on “ending division and strengthening Palestinian unity.”

But a host of problems face any attempt at implementation, and it may well turn out that its main significance lies in the fact that it was mediated by China, which is inexorably expanding its role in the region.

Vagueness

The first problem lies in its vagueness.

There is no date set for implementation and Fatah officials have already said that most agreed measures would only happen after any ceasefire in Gaza.

The focus on a technocratic unity government is also not much different from the discussions held in Moscow in February.

Talks there had moved the parties closer until Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas appointed a new PA government without consultation with Hamas and in contradiction to the spirit of the Moscow talks.

The positive “atmosphere” from Moscow soon dissolved into mutual recriminations, with Abbas’ Fatah faction even releasing a statement blaming Hamas for Israel’s genocidal violence in Gaza.

Those “who were responsible for the return of the occupation to Gaza Strip and caused the Nakba which our Palestinian people live … have no right to dictate national priorities,” Abbas’ faction said in a statement on 15 March.

This time around, Fatah seemed to have gotten the finger-pointing out of the way before the agreement was struck, with one official, Munir al-Yaghoub, apologizing and asking to retract a statement to Saudi outlet al-Arabiya earlier in July basically echoing Israeli talking points:

“If Hamas wanted to fight face-to-face with Israel, it would’ve done so in areas where the army is located, and not in places where there are people,” al-Yaghoub had said. “Hamas is actually hiding between the residents to protect and save itself.”

Fundamental issues

Statements like al-Yaghoub’s underscore the distance between the two factions emanating from a fundamental divergence of strategy.

The PLO, which is Fatah-dominated, renounced armed resistance to Israel’s occupation as part of the 1993 Oslo agreement that also saw it recognize Israel in return for little more than Israeli and US recognition of the PLO as the “sole, legitimate” representative of the Palestinian people.

That renunciation, and the flimsy Israeli concessions given under Oslo, prompted the late Palestinian intellectual Edward Said to resign from the PLO and describe the agreement as an “instrument of Palestinian surrender.”

By contrast, Hamas, in its 2017 charter, described armed resistance as a “legitimate right” and “the strategic choice for protecting the principles and the rights of the Palestinian people.”

Hamas’ position aligns with international law under which a people under occupation have the right to fight “for independence, territorial integrity, national unity and liberation from colonial domination, apartheid and foreign occupation by all available means, including armed struggle.”

But it doesn’t align with Washington’s long-standing position, which has demanded that all Palestinian factions renounce armed struggle against Israel even absent any guarantees that this will end Israel’s occupation, dismantle Israel’s illegal settlements – which have expanded dramatically since Oslo – and see the return of those ethnically cleansed from their homes and lands in the 1947-49 Nakba.

Little surprise then that the US almost instantly rejected the Beijing Declaration, with State Department spokesperson Matt Miller saying: “We made clear we want to see the Palestinian Authority” with a governing role in Gaza, “but no, we do not want to see a role for Hamas.”

US leverage

The US position remains pivotal to Abbas.

While the EU is the largest donor to the Palestinian Authority, the US dominates funding and training for the PA’s security apparatus, specifically set up to “coordinate” with the Israeli military.

The PLO’s exclusively diplomatic strategy has been long buried under the ceaseless expansion of illegal Israeli settlements. But the PA has insisted to continue its always unpopular security “coordination” with Israel – in effect an outsourcing of Israel’s occupation to Ramallah.

Abbas’ popularity, never high, has nose dived as a result of both the strategic failure and the security coordination.

Poll after poll finds Abbas losing to any and all feasible candidates in theoretical elections – presidential terms under Palestinian law should be no longer than five years, but Abbas has not faced any vote since 2005 and has ruled largely by presidential decree for 14 years.

In the latest poll from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, published on 10 July, a full 89 percent of respondents said they wanted Abbas to resign. More than 60 percent support the dissolution of the PA.

In the last poll the question was asked, in March 2023, 63 percent said they wanted an end to all security coordination with Israel.

In other words, shorn of popular, political and legal legitimacy, Abbas depends for his continued rule on his security forces. These, in turn, have increasingly clamped down on domestic dissent, even before 7 October, and with ever-growing violence.

This reliance on the security forces translates into a direct reliance on Washington’s good graces. Indeed, US leverage only grows, the weaker and more unpopular Abbas becomes.

China role

Washington’s support for and complicity with Israel’s genocide in Gaza – not to mention its rank incompetence in pretending it is engaged in any kind of constructive diplomacy – should preclude it from any future diplomatic role in Palestine.

China, which has been increasing its diplomatic and trading role in the region over several years, most notably by forging Saudi-Iranian rapprochement in 2023, is the only country with the financial, military and political clout to seriously challenge US monopoly over regional diplomacy.

And while the Beijing agreement is almost certain to go the way of so many other attempts at reconciling Palestinian factions, it did underscore at least one area of significant agreement: A united rejection of any role for outsiders in a “day-after” scenario in Gaza.

This is perhaps a direct response to the United Arab Emirates maneuvering to insert itself into the Gaza equation, calling for a UAE-led “temporary international mission” in Gaza after a ceasefire.

Palestinian factions might be equally united in opposing any UAE role because of the rumored involvement of Muhammad Dahlan. The erstwhile Fatah leader, now in exile in the UAE after falling out with Abbas, and who oversaw the failed attempt at removing Hamas from power in Gaza in 2007, months ago suggested a similar scenario.

Or the rejection may simply be as a result of a realistic assessment of the record of the UAE’s other foreign interventions in countries like Libya, Yemen, Egypt and others, none of which have resulted in any discernible success.

Nevertheless, it is a point of agreement that provides something to build on. And encouraging a growing role for Beijing and others might just offset Washington’s outsized influence over diplomacy on Palestine.

Indeed, the Beijing Declaration explicitly made this point, according to the leaked document published by al-Masry al-Youm. Commending China for its mediation efforts, the factions, according to the leaked agreement, pledged to work with international partners, specifically China and Russia, to “end the Israeli occupation … under the umbrella and auspices of the United Nations and with broad international and regional participation as an alternative to unilateral and biased American sponsorship.”

And that surely is progress, however minimal.