Opinion/Editorial
Meet the Lebanese Press: Strategic defense or strategic shift?
Hicham Safieddine, Electronic Lebanon, 18 November 2008

Following the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri, and the exit of the Syrian army form Lebanon, it seemed that a new Lebanon was emerging in the horizon. A Lebanon that is free of Syrian control, and ready to perform the perfect role required for the American project in the region: Lebanon would forfeit its resistance, and the axis of opposition to this American project. The attempt for such a transformation failed. The birth of new Lebanon was foiled. Crossing from one camp to the other was neither easy in practical terms nor legitimate in public terms.

After the 2006 July war, and the failure of the Israeli invasion in destroying Hizballah's apparatus, it seemed that yet another Lebanon was emerging. A Lebanon triumphant over foreign interventions. Lebanon the "great power" in the region as Hizballah's secretary general said in the victory rally. Lebanon in which the resistance and her allies possess the upper hand and the ability to affect the course of local events. The attempt also failed. The birth of this new Lebanon fumbled. It became clear that defeating Israel does not neutralize the effect of the intifada of independence [the popular movement that led to the withdrawal of Syrian forces] and does not overcome the sectarian balance of power.

Both parties did not acknowledge the failure of the birth of their new Lebanon. The first party [the Hariri camp] overestimated foreign support, while the second party over-flexed its muscle. The Doha accord kicked in to declare the suspension of political life until parliamentary elections are held. But the provisions of the accord itself and the electoral law it endorsed has in effect suspended political life indefinitely. And polls have begun to indicate that the outcome of these elections will not lead to anything more than a slim victory to one of the camps, which means the continuation of the current polarization and the status quo.

There is no doubt that any military force in the world has its weak and strong points. And Israel, given the type of its weaponry and firepower, possesses an immense destructive power. And the state of its air force allows her to reach deep into the territory of surrounding states. Her weakness though resides in the limited numbers of her land forces and the readiness of these forces. As such, she is unable to fight a resisting community. And if she succeeds in some limited operations, she remains incapable of control and maintaining an occupation.

The other weak point is the big fallout in Israeli society in the face of human loss in war, and her trials in Lebanon were never successful. It follows that deterrence is based on forming two forces, a conventional army and a resistance force. Both forces need to be capable of inflicting loss that the enemy is unable to sustain through:

a) Fighting with small units capable of hiding and protecting themselves and that do not constitute an easy target for air strikes and
b) Creating a modern air force.

This type of combat requires new training for the army's fighting units that would enable it to perform security operations under ordinary formations but to disperse during fighting and resort to guerilla style fighting.

As for resistance forces, it is composed from the population. As such, these forces need to deploy across Lebanon, for the enemy can conduct an airdrop in any part of the country. And we cannot speculate on what will happen in a future war based on what happened in July, for our coastline is accessible and our airspace is exposed and so we need to plan for all possibilities.

And it is natural that the conditions and qualifications for someone to join these two forces be determined by a specialized committee. Members of these forces must possess certain physical, mental, disciplinary, and technical characteristics allowing them to endure hardship.

The nature of security cooperation between Lebanon and Syria needs to be outlined and its goals explained. Do the security measures at the border include intercepting smuggling of men and goods only or weapons and elements described as terrorist to both countries in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701? And are these measures taken so as to eventually implement the truce agreed upon in the past between Lebanon and Israel pending a just and lasting peace? For if [Syrian] President Asad is bent on implementing Resolution 1701 ... then the issue of a defense strategy becomes subject to a bilateral cooperation between the two countries if not an Arab-based one.

If Syria is inclined to face Israel militarily to liberate still-occupied territory, Lebanon will back it in this confrontation and then one can speak of laying down a common defense strategy. But if Syria was opposed to such a confrontation and preferred to conduct indirect peace negotiations with Israel sponsored by Turkey, Lebanon has to join such talk once negotiations become direct. Then, there will be no need for a strategic defense strategy. For if these negotiations culminate in a peace agreement, adopting a defense strategy will violate UN Resolution 1701 and lead to further confrontation with Israel and the continued flow of weapons from Iran and elsewhere through Syria to Hizballah in Lebanon.